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ARGUMENT 
I. IHC's Arguments Cannot Avoid a Trial on the Intensely Fact-Dependent 
Question Whether, Under AH the Circumstances, IHC Waived Forfeiture. 
As to waiver, D&K made two compelling arguments: (1) that waiver is an 
intensely fact dependent question that can be determined as a matter of law only if there 
is but one inference that can be drawn from the totality of the circumstances, and (2) that 
the trial court failed to view the facts regarding waiver in the light most favorable to 
D&K and improperly drew inferences that were the province of the jury. IHC fails to 
rebut either of these arguments in any meaningful way. 
A. IHC Misstates this Court's Treatment of the Facts in D&KL 
With respect to D&K's Statement of Facts, IHC attempts to dismiss all facts that 
support D&K's waiver defense with the assertion that they are "the same facts that this 
Court already found to be irrelevant in D&K /," citing footnote 2 of that opinion. IHC 
Brief at 4. Later, IHC argues that this Court noted that "any factual disputes were 
'irrelevant' or immaterial.'" Id. at 16. In reality, footnote 2 characterized one fact as 
irrelevant—whether D&K's rent payment for February 1998 (prior to the March rent 
default) was timely—and one fact as immaterial—whether April 1998 rent (which IHC 
accepted) was delivered to its property manager or to its corporate office.1 D&K makes 
no issue in this appeal regarding those facts. IHC also overstates this Court's ruling in 
D&K I, claiming that "this Court held that the material facts in this case regarding waiver 
are undisputed." Id Instead, the Court noted that "the material facts in this case appear to 
Thus, rather than relegating to irrelevance the facts on which D&K now relies to 
show waiver, D&K I implicitly acknowledges their significance. 
1 
be undisputed/ ' D&K I, 2003 UT 5, 1J9, while holding that the trial court misapprehended 
"one material fact.* lowever, 
whether a waiver occurred, a mixed question of law and feet to be decided under the 
totality of the circumstances test. Prior to D&K I, that issue could be decided in the 
affirmative as a matter o 
Theat u r . 2d 700 (Utah 1977), because IHC accepted the April 1998 rent and 
other consideration under the Lease after D&K had defaulted on the payment of rent for 
March. After D&K I, that issi ic requires a trial. 
HC Confuses the Standard of Review Regarding Waiver. 
The standard of review of a summary judgment requires the appellate cour 
*S ii*n III fm h in ' 7 11 ir' >f'- - > • ** *P the u r h t most favorable 
to [the non-moving party] . " State Fa* f iuto. Ins. <> v <freen, 2003 UT 48, 
f3 , 89 P.3d 97 (emphasis added). IHC takes the position that, when \yuiu:,i" is the issue, 
11 'Afferent, advocating that 
"trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a waiver has occurred." IHC 
Brief at 8. While this Court accorded "some measure oi deierence" to a trial court's legal 
c judgment ?M u reiterated the 
universal rule that "[s]ummary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact," id, and described its three-step analytical approach as follows: 
In a waiver case decided on a motion for summary judgment, we must first 
inquire whether there are disputed material facts. If there are no disputed 
material facts, we consider all undisputed material facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, Peterson, 2002 UT 42 at f7 , 48 P Id 
941 , before determining whether the trial court 's decision on the 
2 
application of the law of waiver to those facts falls within the bounds of its 
discretion. 
Id. Discretion is accorded the trial court only at the third step—application of the law. On 
the waiver issue, this appeal focuses on the first two steps—whether there is a disputed 
material fact (in the ultimate sense of whether a waiver occurred) and whether the trial 
court considered all undisputed material facts from which waiver could be inferred in the 
light most favorable to D&K. Those issues are addressed below. 
IHC's reliance on Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7 (Utah App. 1995), 
for the proposition that a summary judgment as to waiver is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion is unavailing. Kudlik did not involve a summary judgment motion at all, but 
rather a ruling, based on a trial in an unlawful detainer case, that no waiver had occurred. 
C. IHC Misconstrues the Escrow Agreement and Overstates its Effect. 
Relying in whole or in part on the Consent, Reservation of Rights and Escrow 
Deposit Agreement dated March 1, 1999 (the "Escrow Agreement"), R157-162, IHC 
makes the following points: 
1. "The Escrow Agreement was designed to preserve the status quo of the 
landlord/tenant relationship, without either party being accused of having 
waived their arguments in this litigation." IHC Brief at 7. 
2. "IHC's post-Termination Notice conduct cannot now be claimed a waiver 
of its rights to terminate D&K's leasehold." Id. at 8. 
3. "Moreover, the trial court properly concluded that IHC's actions were . . . 
undertaken pursuant to the Escrow Agreement by which D&K agreed that 
IHC's conduct would not constitute a waiver." Id. at 10. 
3 
'The parties do not dispute that IHC never accepted2 or cashed any rent 
check after April 1998, except under the Escrow Agreement, pursuant to 
which D&K agreed that IHC did 'not waive its claims of default and/or 
forfeiture of the Lease.'" Id. at 18. 
"D&K argues that IHC's receipt of rent checks under the Escrow 
Agreement . . . create[s] a triable dispute as to whether an implied waiver 
occurred." M at 19 
6. "D&K's argument that IHC engaged in "dozens of acts Ittat recognized 
the Lease as in force' (Appellant's Br. at 20), is directly contrary to D&K's 
contractual agreement " Id. at 21 "*° 
F.uii ( I In iiiHH!r.li,iiI»l\ liilM l'i iiiiiil ick -my factual basis and are not 
true. The other points claim too much for the Escrow Agreement M was dated March 1, 
1999, long after IHC had declared U6,. . ,„ >rleited. 
affirniiilisv I i i I - eptance 1998 rent, "Dear Tenant" letters 
seeking to hold D&K to the strict terms of the Lease and many invoices for rent), and 
there were numerous instances < • • : . . . n as retentu:., amerous 
checks 1: ;; II IC foi i i i anths ait id * ' )&K summarized and discussed those 
facts, Brief of Appellant at 5-6, 17- 18, and IHC has not disputed them.. The Escrow 
Agreement expressly reserved D&K's right to argue waiver on those a., n provided 
tl • defenses by si^nin^, liu/ Escrow Agreement 
or by D&K being allowed to remain in possession of the leased premises oi to make 
2
 The reality is that D&K has maintained the position throughout this case that, by 
retaining most of D&K's rent checks tendered from May 1998 through February 1999 
(prior to the Escrow ^ greement), IHC accepted D&K's tendered rent. R42, f 18. 
3
 "[A]ll of D&K Management's defenses against the claims and assertion 
IHCHS, whether articulated before or after the date of this Escrow Agreement ;J\ 
expressly reserved and not waived by reason of this Escrow Agreement or otherwise and 
shall not in any way be lessened or diminished by reason of or in connection with the 
execution and delivery of this Escrow Agreement." R15 8 
4 
deposits thereafter with the escrow agent. Thus, it is IHC's argument that is "directly 
contrary" to its contractual agreement. 
D. D&K'S Counsel Never Conceded that There Was Not a Triable Issue as to 
the Waiver Defense. 
Another fallacy on which IHC places enormous reliance is its contention that 
D&K's counsel conceded at a hearing on May 26, 2004, that "there were no disputed 
facts on the issue of possession." IHC Brief at 17. The hearing in question took place 
after the trial court had granted IHC's Motion to Modify Order or for Summary Judgment 
rejecting the defense of waiver following remand from this Court in D&KL The purpose 
of the hearing was to address IHC's request for a certification of finality under Rule 
54(b). In the exchange between the trial court and D&K's counsel, the court inquired as 
to the presence of "overlapping facts" for purposes of applying the Kennecott4 analysis to 
Rule 54(b). Counsel's response was that, "given the Court's ruling [summary judgment 
against D&K], there are no facts left-no facts that have to be decided." Transcript, Rl 108 
at 4-5. Counsel then repeated his qualification, "given this ruling," meaning that his 
response was premised on the Court having already ruled against D&K on waiver. 
In opposing IHC's Motion to Modify Order or for Summary Judgment following 
remand, D&K argued that it was entitled to an inference of waiver based on the true facts 
concerning the April 1998 payment (which the trial court had misapprehended). R799 
("[correction of this factual error adds one more fact from which an inference of waiver 
can be drawn"). D&K argued that waiver was "a genuine issue of fact to be resolved by 
the jury." R803. It argued that "[i]t is only when the facts permit of a single conclusion 
4
 Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). 
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that waiver may be decided as a matter of law." R804. D&K argued that waiver "cannot 
be resolved on a motion for summary judgment if the evidence can give rise to differing 
inferences." Id. It further cited controlling authority holding that on a motion for 
summary judgment the court may not draw fact inferences regarding intent. Id. 
Having carefully presented these arguments in its memorandum, it is inconceiv-
able that D&K's counsel would, in an off-the-cuff response to a question of the court on a 
different point, volunteer that everything he had argued in writing was wrong. Counsel's 
statement must be considered in context of the entire transcript. Counsel stated that 
"D&K firmly believes that IHC waived its remedy," Transcript, Rl 108 at 9 (Addendum 
A), reminded the court that waiver is "an intensely factual issue," id, clearly expressed 
his view that "D&K is entitled to a trial on that issue," id. at 9-10, and reiterated "that 
we're entitled to a trial on that issue because it is a factual issue." Id. at 10. 
Thus, counsel was not abandoning D&K's central argument that it was entitled to 
a trial to determine what inferences should be drawn from the undisputed historical facts. 
While counsel may have been speaking to the first step of the three-part analysis 
discussed in D&K I {i.e., historical, but not inferential, facts were undisputed), he was not 
addressing the second, that of viewing the facts in the light most favorable to D&K, 
which includes considering all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts. 
E. When Viewed in the Light Most Favorable to D&K, the Facts Support an 
Inference of Waiver by IHC. 
IHC purports to analyze the facts in the light most favorable to D&K and, not 
surprisingly, concludes that they could not possibly support an inference that IHC waived 
the right to forfeit the Lease. IHC's analysis suffers from several glaring flaws. 
6 
First, it begins with the premise that D&K I limited the trial court, in performing 
the three-step analysis described above, to the narrowest of roles-that of considering 
IHC's retention of the April 1998 rent payment on the assumption that the trial court's 
previous ruling was otherwise correct in all respects. That premise collides with this 
Court's opinion of that ruling as being "premature, at best": 
Under the totality of the circumstances test required by Soter 's, the fact that 
IHC retained D&K's payment for April rent is material. D&K presented the 
trial court with a list of actions by IHC that D&K believed amounted to 
waiver. The trial court considered each of them, but it could not have 
considered the cumulative impact of those facts coupled with the retention 
of April rent because it apparently believed that the rent was not retained by 
IHC, Because of the absence of this fact in the trial court's analysis, the 
grant of summary judgment was premature, at best. 
D&K I, 2003 UT 5, [^9. On remand for "further proceedings consistent with this opinion," 
id f 12, the trial court was to apply the three-step analysis prescribed by the Court.5 On 
the second step, it was required to "consider all undisputed material facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id ^6 (emphasis added). It was not authorized 
to analyze the facts concerning the April payment to the exclusion of all others. 
Second, IHC quarrels with this Court's opinion that "the fact that IHC retained 
D&K's payment for April rent is material." Id. [^9. After discussing its own views on the 
significance of the April rent, IHC concludes, "the April rent is irrelevant to either the 
question of default by D&K or waiver by IHC." IHC Brief at 20. In fact, IHC is bound by 
this Court's opinion that IHC's retention of the April rent is material. 
The third step is slightly different at the trial court, which must itself apply the 
law of waiver to the facts after they have been viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. 
7 
Third, knowing that its narrow perception of the trial court's role on remand may 
be incorrect, IHC contends that all of the other facts relied on by D&K to support waiver 
"do not give rise to an inference that IHC intended to affirm the Lease for two main 
reasons." Id. at 21. The first is that the trial court's "stay" forced IHC to "act as D&K's 
'landlord'" and to "undertake certain actions to protect itself, such as requiring that the 
building be insured." Id. IHC throws time out of joint. Every fact D&K relies upon to 
show waiver occurred between March 1998 (when a breach occurred) and March 1, 1999 
(signing of Escrow Agreement). During that entire period, not only was there no stay, but 
there was no case pending in which a stay could have been issued. 
The second "main reason" proffered by IHC as vitiating all of the actions and 
inactions of IHC as bases for inferring waiver is the Escrow Agreement. As discussed 
above, the Escrow Agreement did not extinguish, but expressly preserved, all previously 
existing defenses, including all grounds for waiver. 
Apart from these "two main reasons," IHC offers no other reason why D&K 
should not be entitled, on summary judgment, to an inference of waiver based on all of 
the facts apart from IHC's retention of the April 1998 rent. When reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, this Court liberally construes all inferences that may be reasonably 
drawn from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 
818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991). Moreover, "[wjhere a waiver prevents a forfeiture, the 
law ordinarily permits a liberal construction to be placed on the acts of the party waiving 
with the view of bringing about a waiver of such a forfeiture." Sullivan v. Beneficial Life 
Ins. Co., 64 P.2d 351, 361 (Utah 1937), quoting Loftis v. Mutual Ins. Co., 114 P. 134 
8 
(Utah 1911). The trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous, and this case 
should be remanded for a jury trial on the issue of waiver. 
II. Substantial Compliance Should Be Considered on the Merits. 
Both parties recognize the trial court's power to reconsider and revise its non-final 
orders. D&K submits that this power is broad, giving the court a valuable and flexible 
tool for reaching just results. IHC perceives this power as a timid, hide-bound concept 
hedged about by numerous virtually impenetrable checkpoints designed to keep the court 
as far from the merits as possible. These differing views reflect the inherent tension 
between the goal of fairly deciding controversies based on the facts and the law and that 
of judicial efficiency. Underlying this debate lurks the stark reality that the loss to D&K 
from forfeiture would cost it $3.2 million based on a five-year damage horizon, while the 
loss to IHC of 46 days' interest on $3,280 was only $41.34, which D&K offered to pay 
eightfold, Brief of Appellant at 31-32, and IHC would, if the Lease survives, receive 
exactly what it bargained for when it bought the property subject to the Lease. 
As will be shown below, the trial court did not soundly exercise discretion on this 
question, as it both ruled that it had none and based its decision on critical legal errors. In 
its brief, IHC makes many dubious or wrong assumptions and arguments, as well as 
inaccurate representations or characterizations concerning the record. D&K will address 
those matters but will first offer a larger perspective. 
A. Based on Correct Legal Conclusions and Applying Proper Standards, It 
Would Have Been an Abuse of Discretion to Refuse Consideration of the 
Substantial Compliance Defense. 
IHC argues that its motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in the earliest 
stage of this case (prior to any discovery, with no supporting affidavits and based solely 
9 
on the pleadings) put D&K under obligation to support all of its defenses factually and 
with legal authority even though IHC's motion mentioned only two of them. Its argument 
fails to comprehend the limitations of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
A motion by plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings can only stand upon 
the basis that defendants' answer admits all plaintiffs material allegations 
and offers nothing in bar or by way of avoidance. It is in order only when 
the answer raises no issue or states no facts which in law could be a defense 
to any part of plaintiff s claim as covered in the motion. 
Harman v. Yeager, 110 P.2d 352, 353-354 (Utah 1941). Such motions are disfavored, and 
great liberality in construing the assailed pleading should be allowed. MBNA America 
Bank, N.A. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 432,1J2, 147 P.3d 536. 
Three months after the remittitur following D&K /, IHC renewed its effort to 
obtain a forfeiture ruling by seeking partial summary judgment. IHC cites several cases 
for the proposition that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must support 
any affirmative defenses or waive them. IHC Brief at 27-28. On this question the cases 
are sharply divided. While Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F.Supp. 1164 
(S.D.Ind. 1992), supports IHC's position, it has been soundly rejected in Cytec Industries, 
Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 232 F.Supp.2d 821, 829 (S.D. Ohio 2002) ("The reasoning of 
the Pantry court is not supported by any provision of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure nor any case law."). 
In the context of summary judgment, it is well settled that the moving party 
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the 
basis for its motion. This initial burden remains with the moving party, 
even when the issue involved is one on which the non-movant will bear the 
burden of proof at trial, such as the Defendant's affirmative defenses in the 
present case. 
Given the Plaintiffs failure to address the Defendant's affirmative 
defenses in its initial summary judgment Memorandum, the Defendant had 
10 
no obligation in its opposing Memorandum to demonstrate a genuine issue 
of material fact with respect to those defenses. . . . Regardless of the 
Court's ruling on the Plaintiffs Motion, those affirmative defenses will 
remain viable in this litigation, as the Plaintiff has not properly moved for 
summary judgment on them. 
Books-A-Million, Inc. v. H & N Enters., Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 846, 851 (S.D. Ohio 2001) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 
2002 UT 69, f31, 54 P.3d 1054, this Court clarified the order of business to be that "once 
the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to 
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." 
Other cases relied on by IHC should be distinguished. In Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 
334 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2003), the issue was whether a party's failure to explicitly raise an 
issue before the district court foreclosed that party from raising the issue for the first time 
on appeal. Rocafort pointed out as a significant ground for its decision that such party 
"never called the district court's attention to its alleged error by way of a motion for 
reconsideration." Id. at 122. In contrast, D&K did exactly that. In H & G Ortho, Inc. v. 
Neodontics Intern., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. App. 2005), the ruling that an issue not 
raised in the trial court could not be reviewed on appeal was based on the rule that "once 
the moving party designates evidence relevant to an affirmative defense, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to come forward with competent evidence to support the affirmative 
defense." Id. at 731. In the present case, IHC's motion for summary judgment, after 
D&K I, did not address the defense of unconscionability/substantial compliance. Since 
IHC never challenged D&K's case with respect to unconscionability, D&K was not 
11 
obligated to present evidence supporting it. Thus, the defense should not be deemed 
waived. 
An oral forfeiture ruling issued on March 2, 2004, but the written order was not 
settled until July 29, 2004. Meanwhile, on May 26, 2004, D&K advised the court that 
substantial compliance remained to be decided, reiterated that the law abhors a forfeiture 
and referred to Housing Auth. of Salt Lake City v. Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163 (Utah App. 
1996), and Cache County v. Bern, 1999 UT App. 134; 978 P.2d 1043. Brief of Appellant 
at 9-10; see p. 19, infra. The court expressed its incorrect opinion that those issues had 
already been decided as part of its ruling on waiver. Id. Counsel's statements constituted 
"inadequate briefing" or the oral equivalent thereof. D&K was entitled to ask the court in 
a fully briefed motion to reconsider its erroneous legal conclusion that a decision on 
waiver is a decision on substantial compliance. 
Turning to the topic of judicial efficiency, no case management order was entered 
(except as to IHC's later abandoned Supplemental Complaint), nor was there a time limit 
set for amending pleadings or completing discovery. No trial date was ever set. D&K 
specifically raised substantial compliance with the court a short time after it ruled in favor 
of forfeiture but two months before the order ultimately memorializing the ruling was 
entered. The facts supporting substantial compliance were in the record by June 10, 2004, 
R912-927, and IHC had ample opportunity to investigate them in the battle over a stay 
pending appeal. Since D&K was entitled to a trial on damages and waiver, the 
incremental burden of trying substantial compliance would have been minor. Moreover, 
even if it had been the only issue, a trial on substantial compliance would have consumed 
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far less of the court's time than the parties' battles over Rule 54(b) certification, stays 
pending appeal and IHC's attorney fees. In short, efficiency considerations were not 
compelling. 
Efficiency cannot hold a candle to the countervailing consideration of doing 
justice between the parties. Here, forfeiture was declared without any cure period 
whatsoever being afforded to D&K. Even the forfeiture notice was suspect, relying on a 
claimed failure to pay April 1998 rent, when IHC had already received that rent. Upon 
receiving the notice, D&K immediately tendered the March 1998 rent (along with a 10% 
late fee), which IHC's designated agent accepted and receipted. IHC then returned it. The 
loss of D&K's leasehold would have a devastating financial impact, with losses 
amounting to millions of dollars. Forfeiture would be manifestly unjust. The trial court 
made an error. Even if the error, however, were solely that of D&K's counsel, it would be 
manifestly unjust to refuse to consider a defense so compelling as substantial compliance 
against a claim so draconian as forfeiture. With such extreme harm juxtaposed against 
pallid excuses for refusing to consider the defense, the trial court's ruling, had it chosen 
to exercise its discretion based on a correct application of legal principles, would have 
been an abuse of discretion. 
B. The Elements of the Trial Court's Decision Are Reviewed for Correctness. 
With respect to the trial court's denial of D&K's motion for reconsideration, IHC 
simplistically advocates that the standard of review is simply whether the trial court 
abused its discretion, citing Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996). IHC Brief at 
9. In Timm, however, the Court held that, if the trial court's decision was based on an 
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erroneous legal conclusion, that alone constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1388. 
Similarly, one of the cases cited by Timm for the abuse of discretion standard is Gillmor 
v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993), in which the Court articulated the standard of 
review for a motion to reconsider (in the context of Rule 60(b)) as follows: 
"A motion or action to modify a final judgment is addressed to the 
discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which must be based on sound 
legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances." 
Id, quoting Laub v. South Central Utah Tel Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982). 
An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is premised on an erroneous legal 
conclusion or is not based on "sound legal principles in light of all relevant 
circumstances." 
C. IHC's Arguments Concerning Materiality and Unconscionability Are 
Premised on the Assumption that Such Matters Are Affirmative Defenses. 
D&K argued in its opening brief that a landlord fails to state a claim for forfeiture 
unless it pleads materiality of the breach. Appellant's Brief at 22. Disputing that 
conclusion, IHC premises its arguments concerning materiality, substantial compliance 
and unconscionability on the assumption that all aspects of such matters are affirmative 
defenses. Many courts reject that assumption, placing the burden of proof on the landlord. 
In order to evict a tenant in North Carolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That 
it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the 
alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act 
or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) 
that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) 
that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable. 
Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (N.C.App. 1996) 
(emphasis added). Accord, Oxford Associates Real Estate, L.P. v. TSI Society Hill, Inc., 
2007 WL 128886, *3 (E.D.Pa. 2007) ("Since Landlord has failed to show that it is 
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entitled to the extraordinary remedy of forfeiture and that the result would not be 
unconscionable, judgment in favor of Tenant is appropriate.")- See Helsam Realty Co., 
Inc. v. HJ.A. Holding Corp., 781 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (N.Y. Supp. App. Term 2004) ("In 
order for a forfeiture clause to be enforced . . . the result of enforcing the forfeiture must 
not be unconscionable."), citing 2 Dolan, Rasch's Landlord and Tenant Summary 
Proceedings § 23:39 [4th ed]. 
This issue is of such importance that it ought to be decided, both to guide the 
parties and the trial court in this case and to clarify for future cases what elements must 
be pleaded and proven to accomplish forfeiture of a lease. While IHC contends that the 
issue has been waived, its argument fails to recognize the unique status of the defense of 
failure to state a claim afforded by Rule 12(h), Ut. R. Civ. P., which provides as an 
exception to the general rule of waiver applicable to matters not presented by motion, 
answer or reply that: 
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits . . . . 
Decisions applying the identical federal rule clarify its effect. E.g., Martin v. 
Southwestern Virginia Gas Co., 135 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 1998) ("If the defendant pleaded 
as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff failed to state a claim, the defense is preserved 
even if the trial court did not rule upon it."); Westland v. Sero of New Haven, Inc., 601 
F.Supp. 163 (D. 111.1985) (defendant did not waive motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
cause of action since that defense was raised in its answer to the complaint). Further, in 
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Martin the court held that the issue of failure to state a claim was preserved for appeal 
even though not addressed by the trial court. 
D. IHC's Hypertechnicai Argument that D&K Did Not Plead Substantial 
Compliance Is Inconsistent with the Concept of Notice Pleading. 
D&K asserted "unconscionability" as a separate defense in its Answer. R45, 
Seventh Defense. Despite that, IHC relies upon hypertechnicai hairsplitting, arguing that 
it was never "put on notice that D&K intended to rely on a substantial compliance 
defense" and that "D&K offers no explanation as to how IHC or the trial court should 
have surmised that its defense of 'unconscionability' encompassed a possible 'substantial 
compliance' argument." IHC Brief at 24. The answer lies in the case law. 
It is only when the forfeiture would be so grossly excessive as to be entirely 
disproportionate to any possible loss that might have been contemplated, so 
that to enforce it would shock the conscience, that a court of equity will 
refuse to enforce the provision. 
Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1954). If a result would "shock the 
conscience" or cause forfeiture "disproportionate to any possible loss," it is 
unconscionable. 
It is also axiomatic that a Court of equity may relieve a lessee against 
forfeiture when the effect of enforcing the tenant's default would result in 
an eviction which would be unconscionable, inequitable or unjust under the 
circumstances. 
Smith v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 448 So.2d 62, 63 (Fla.App. 1984). 
Over the years, Utah courts began to use the term "substantial compliance" to 
refer, or give greater definition to, this concept of unconscionability of result. See U-Beva 
Mines v. Toledo Min. Co., 471 P.2d 867, 869 (Utah 1970); Cache County v. Beus, 1999 
UT App 134, ^ 28; 978 P.2d 1043. In a lease forfeiture action, a tenant opposing forfeiture 
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could allege that the breach was not material6, serious or substantial, that the result sought 
would "shock the conscience of the court/' that the tenant had "substantially complied" 
with the lease, or that the result sought is barred by the doctrine of "unconscionability." 
In notice pleading it ought not matter which of these terms is chosen by the tenant's 
lawyer. 
It is evident from these statements that the fundamental purpose of our 
liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties "the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute," 
subject only to the requirement that their adversary have "fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type 
of litigation involved." The functions of issue-formulation and fact-
revelation are appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process. The 
rules "allow examination into the settlement of all issues bearing upon the 
controversy," with latitude for proof that extends beyond the pleadings, 
where appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears from the cited decisions that 
these principles are applied with great liberality in sustaining the 
sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of action or an affirmative 
defense. 
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Even if it had the burden to plead this point, D&K is entitled to liberality in 
sustaining the sufficiency of its allegation of "unconscionability" as preserving the 
defense that there was no material default a la Beus and D&K had substantially complied 
with the Lease in good faith. 
E. D&K I Did Not Purport to Rule on the Defense of Unconscionability. 
In an attempted verbal sleight of hand, IHC argues that D&K I disposed of all 
issues involving unconscionability in its ruling as to equitable estoppel, merely because 
Under Beus, the materiality analysis includes the five factors listed in 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981), as quoted in Brief of Appellant at 33. 
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the Court used the word "unconscionable" twice in its analysis of estoppel by 
acquiescence. IHC Brief at 25. When this Court analyzed D&K's estoppel defense in 
D&K /, it did not wander afield and attempt to determine, without briefing or argument, 
whether forfeiture of the Lease was an unconscionable result under U-Beva and Bens 
standards. Its analysis was strictly confined to the estoppel defense: 
Estoppel by acquiescence is applicable when "it would be unconscionable 
to permit a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he 
. . . has acquiesced." Permitting IHC to enforce the forfeiture provision of 
the written lease after D & K's failure to pay rent following a one-month 
acquiescence in late payment is not unconscionable, and D & K's estoppel 
argument therefore fails as a matter of law. 
2003 UT 5, f 11 (citation omitted). This language did not purport to be and was clearly 
not intended to be a ruling, as a matter of law, that forfeiture of a leasehold worth 
millions was not an unconscionable result in light of U-Beva and Beus, which the Court 
never mentioned. Surely, where forfeiture is sought, D&K is entitled to the same 
solicitude and even-handed analysis afforded to Cache County in Bens, 
F. The "Concessions" of Counsel Claimed by IHC Are Belied by Context. 
IHC trumpets as the centerpiece of its heroic effort to prevent a decision on the 
merits of the doctrine of substantial compliance a claimed concession by D&K's counsel 
in the course of a hearing on a different matter-that of Rule 54(b) certification. As 
discussed at 5, supra, counsel's statement was subject to the qualification "given the 
Court's ruling." At that point, the trial court was not conducting a rehearing on its prior 
grant of summary judgment on possession. Rather, it wanted to know whether "there are 
. . . facts yet to be resolved with respect to the issue of forfeiture and possession that are 
in common with the facts to be resolved regarding the breach of contract damages claim." 
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Transcript, R1108 at 37 (emphasis added). More importantly, the transcript as a whole 
clearly reveals that, whatever counsel may have thought the court was asking, he did not 
intend to waive D&K's ability to rely on the doctrine of substantial compliance. 
When the court raised the issue of "where we go from here procedurally," id. at 34 
(Addendum A), counsel referred to the Delgado and Bens cases and advised the court 
that the issues thereunder "are yet to be decided in this case." Id. The court expressed its 
opinion that those issues had necessarily been decided as part of its ruling on waiver, 
saying: 
I don't think the Court can determine forfeiture—wavier [sic] 
equaling forfeiture without implicitly dealing with the Delgado-Buse [sic] 
line and the non-substantial—whatever the term is. 
Id. Twice in the same hearing counsel had stated the principle that "the law abhors a 
forfeiture." Id. at 8, 16. He used the term "substantial compliance" thrice. Id. at 15-16, 
34. He noted that there are cases striking down forfeiture where a party "may have 
missed on a technicality." Id. at 15-16. When viewed as a whole in their context, the 
statements of D&K's counsel demonstrate the opposite of what IHC claims for them.9 
Another instance of IHC's reliance on statements of D&K's counsel taken out of 
context is its argument that the trial court gave, and D&K declined, repeated 
opportunities to raise defenses other than waiver. IHC Brief at 29. IHC's argument is 
7
 The herein-cited pages of the Transcript are attached in Addendum A. 
o 
The reporter inaccurately transcribed this phrase as "the law enforce the 
forfeiture." 
9
 Moreover, since the trial court incorrectly conflated waiver and the substantial 
compliance doctrine, a motion for reconsideration was precisely the right procedure. 
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wrong in every way. It cites but one short passage of the record, not many. The trial 
court's question, whether the law of summary judgment precluded a ruling as a matter of 
law that no waiver had occurred, cannot be rationally construed as an invitation to present 
other affirmative defenses. Attempting to cast the response as something different from 
what was said, IHC resorts to extreme editing of the two-page long response by D&K's 
counsel (interspersed with comments by the court) to reduce it to two words, "Absolutely 
. . . waiver . . . . " IHC's argument is absolutely unfounded. 
G. The Trial Court Exercised No Discretion on Reconsideration. 
Curiously, IHC argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to 
consider substantial compliance even though it: (1) ruled, based on law of the case, that it 
had no discretion, (2) failed to apply the standards applicable to a Rule 54(b) decision, 
and (3) turned a blind eye to the compelling facts in the record supporting D&K's 
substantial compliance argument. As discussed at 13-14, supra, an exercise of discretion 
"must be based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances" and, if it 
is based on an erroneous legal conclusion, constitutes an abuse of discretion for that 
reason alone. 
1. Law of the Case Did Not Deprive the Trial Court of Discretion, 
Stating it "does not believe it has had the right or discretion to consider" 
substantial compliance on the merits, Rl372-73, the trial court cited only Smith v. 
Osguthorpe, 2005 UT App 11 (unpublished opinion), and said it was persuaded by a 
statement therein that "when there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to 
10
 The relevant pages of the March 2, 2004 Transcript are attached in Addendum 
B. 
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those issues which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the 
other proceeding." R1373. Implicitly conceding that Osguthorpe does not correctly state 
the law, IHC attempts to recast the trial court's ruling as having been based on some 
other uncited case(s) and some other unarticulated rule(s). 
The January 2006 Order plainly evinces the trial court's opinion that the prior 
appeal resulting in D&K I had a preclusive effect, both with respect to issues decided 
therein and with respect to any issues that might have been raised prior to or in the course 
of that appeal R1371, ^|6, R1373, ^|9. In its opening brief, D&K discussed the principle, 
contrary to the trial court's view, that a ruling on a prior appeal is a basis for law of the 
case only with respect to issues actually or necessarily decided in that appeal. In support 
thereof D&K cited five decisions of this Court. Brief of Appellant at 25-26. IHC does not 
dispute this rule and does not question any of the authorities cited by D&K in support 
thereof. Instead, IHC incorrectly describes it as the "mandate rule"11 and employs the 
straw man tactic of arguing that "D&K is wrong in arguing that the requirements of the 
'mandate rule' applied to the trial court on its Motion to Reconsider." IHC Brief at 33. In 
fact, D&K made no such argument. At bedrock, since the trial court's decision that it had 
no discretion in the matter was based on an erroneous legal principle, the January 2006 
Order cannot stand. 
The mandate rule is that an inferior court is required to honor the mandate of a 
superior court within a single judicial system. Here, there was no ruling or mandate in 
D&K I with respect to substantial compliance issues, yet the trial court acted as if it had 
received a mandate not to consider those issues. 
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D&K cited two decisions of this Court holding that law of the case does not 
prevent a judge from reconsidering previous nonfinal orders pursuant to Rule 54(b). Brief 
of Appellant at 28-29. IHC ignores both cases, advocating instead a rule opposite to their 
holdings. IHC offers no rationale to persuade this Court to abandon its prior decisions, 
and it should not do so. 
2. The Trial Court Failed to Apply Correct Legal Principles. 
In failing to apply the standards governing Rule 54(b), the trial court failed to 
apply sound legal principles. The reasoning in its January 2006 Order consisted primarily 
of four elements. First, the court repeated six times with minor variations the view that 
D&K did not raise, argue or brief the defense of substantial compliance. Second, it 
incorrectly ruled (as discussed above) that it was precluded by law of the case and res 
judicata from considering the issue. Third, it relied, adopting language proposed by IHC, 
on the erroneous notions discussed above that D&K was arguing that unconscionability is 
not the same defense as substantial compliance and that D&K told the court at a 54(b) 
certification hearing that there were no facts left to be considered on forfeiture. Fourth, it 
ruled that the facts presented did not support substantial compliance. 
3. D&K Presented Compelling Facts Showing Substantial Compliance, 
One of the most astounding errors of the trial court was its conclusion that the 
facts presented by D&K did not support substantial compliance. This error was 
thoroughly exposed in D&K's opening brief. Brief of Appellant at 32-35. IHC's response 
is yet another iteration of its refrain that D&K I had rejected unconscionability as a 
separate defense. IHC Brief at 42. This time, however, IHC also cites, out of context, 
passages from D&K's brief filed in the prior appeal. That brief is not part of the record, 
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but should the Court choose to review it anyway, it will be abundantly clear that D&K's 
prior argument addressed its estoppel defense exclusively. 
IHC sedulously avoids any mention of the facts relied on by D&K and never 
contradicts D&K's argument that it has a far more compelling case for substantial 
compliance than did Cache County in Bens. IHC incorrectly claims Kudlik and Olympus 
Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 
1994), "allowed forfeiture of a lease based on the simple failure of the tenant to pay rent." 
Id. at 42-43. Kudlik never mentioned forfeiture but was an unlawful detainer case, in 
which the tenant was afforded multiple opportunities to cure, unlike D&K, which 
received none. Olympus Hills allowed termination of a lease after notice of default, a 
thirty-day cure period and absence of cure, for violation of a continuous operations 
clause—not for a rent default. The trial court, relying apparently on the same argument 
made by IHC below, R1281, erroneously determined that D&K's substantial compliance 
defense would be futile. Since that defense was not futile, but supported by compelling 
facts, the trial court's ruling was fatally based on an erroneous legal conclusion. 
III. IHC Fails to Show Any Contractual Basis for the Attorney Fees Award. 
The trial court ruled that IHC expressly waived any claim to attorney's fees under 
Section 17.2 of the Lease and cannot recover fees thereunder. R1385 n.l. IHC did not 
appeal that ruling. It chose to rely solely on Section 23, which requires for an award of 
fees that the action be filed "during the term of this Lease." D&K cited four decisions of 
this Court that when a landlord elects to terminate a lease for breach, the termination is 
effective, if at all, when the notice is given. Brief of Appellant at 37. That occurred over a 
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year prior to the action. Nowhere has IHC questioned those decisions or cited any 
authority for the trial court's novel conclusion that the Lease was not terminated until the 
court ruled in favor of ejectment. 
IV. The Fee Award Was Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence, Included Fees for 
Matters on Which IHC Did Not Succeed and Resulted from an Improper 
Shifting of the Burden of Proof to D&K. 
IHC mistakenly argues that a 300-page record created over a period of eleven 
months in obtaining a fee award, based on sheer volume, constitutes sufficient evidence 
to support the fees awarded. A mass of information without the mandatory allocation 
among successful and unsuccessful matters remains insufficient to sustain IHC's 
evidentiary burden. As D&K demonstrated with extensive detail, the information 
submitted by IHC reveals numerous time entries irrelevant to the case and therefore 
unreasonable or that obviously applied to matters on which IHC did not prevail. 
The only defense offered for the trial court's improper shifting of the burden of 
allocating fees to D&K is IHC's argument that, despite a one-month extension, D&K did 
not do IHC's job of sifting thousands of time entries in a 90-page affidavit and allocating 
them among the seven discrete matters named by D&K on which IHC did not prevail. 
IHC cites no precedent for the strange proposition that the burden of allocating fees can 
be shifted to the party against whom an award of fees is sought merely by granting it an 
extension of time. 
Straining to make the fee award appear reasonable even in the absence of 
sufficient evidence and compliance with the allocation task, IHC argues that the trial 
court "made numerous discounts" to the fees requested. IHC Brief at 49. As the first 
24 
example, IHC points to a "discount of $91,205.96" from counsel's standard rates. Id. In 
reality, counsel billed IHC at the discounted levels, and the court imposed no reduction 
from the levels at which IHC was billed. The only reductions made by the court were 
incomplete reductions for some of the matters on which IHC did not prevail. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
As stated with more specificity in the Brief of Appellant at 48-49, each of the trial 
court's orders from which this appeal was taken should be reversed, and this case should 
be remanded for trial, with a conditional award of attorney fees to D&K for this appeal. 
DATED this 7A*» day of June, 2007. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
A Professional Corporation 
By:x_-
Michael N. Zundel, Esq. 
James C. Swindler 
Glenn R. Bronson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 2004; 12:00 NOON 
HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER, JUDGE PRESIDING-
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We are on the record in the matter of 
IHC Health Services, Incorporated, against D & K Management, 
case number 990905693. Please state appearances. 
MR. DURHAM: Matthew Durham on behalf of IHC Health 
Services. I have Matthew Moscon with me. 
MR. BRONSON: Glenn Bronson and Mike Zundel on behalf 
of D & K Management -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BRONSON: - principals of D & K with us, Mr. 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Thank you. I think I'm glad we're here 
together on this. It's one of those ones that in a way becomes 
very messy, and I apologize. I think I've contributed to the 
mess in some efforts to keep the thing moving, and the most 
recent amended order, I don't even think that's correct, 
unfortunately. 
But we're here really on the issues of (inaudible) 
judgment to Rule 54(b), certification, et cetera. And there's 
not much disagreement that the Court has made a final 
determination on summary judgment on forfeiture, a declaratory 
judgment. There is remaining the breach-of-contract claim on 
damages. Do we all agree on that, which I think I messed up in 
1 unlawful-detainer statutes are that — first of all, that the 
2 law enforce the forfeiture. And so the unlawful detainer 
3 statutes are set up to give a tenant to — this is rent, a 
4 monetary obligation under a lease, numerous obligations — at 
5 least two in writing, one by the court and one by a landlord, 
6 the option to cure any monetary defaults. 
7 That is not the procedure under which IHC elected to 
8 proceed. They elected to proceed under the common-law 
9 ejectment rules, which do not give a tenant the opportunity to 
10 cure. You're in breach, then you go before the court, you 
11 argue your breach, but it also delays an immediate eviction 
12 remedy. And so it puts the court in a position where, instead 
13 of the statutory provisions, where you can't separate 
14 possession and damages, we're not in a position to do that. 
15 This is common-law ejectment, and many cases do uphold that. 
16 So — well, we didn't get the opportunity to cure. 
17 They also don't get the opportunity to kick us out on a. 
18 possession order that's not final and it's not appealable. 
19 THE COURT: The problem is I do understand the 
20 reasons of the rule; I understand that it's efficiency in terms 
21 of appellate review. But isn't it subject to incredible abuse 
22 in a landlord-tenant context where someone whose right to 
23 possession has been determined to no longer exist, can stay in 
24 possession, increase the damages for a potentially long time, 
25 simply because there can be factual disputes and the need to 
1 get to trial on the damage claims, whereas it seems like it can 
2 give a - it can sort of trump the right to possess one's own 
3 property — 
4 MR. BRONSON: Well, your Honor -
5 THE COURT: - on almost a technicality? 
6 MR. BRONSON: Your Honor, the issue of whether or not 
7 someone is wrongfully in possession is the issue that is at 
8 stake here. 
9 THE COURT: Well, that's the question. Is that at 
10 stake? If that was at stake, I'd say I'm with you all the way. 
11 What is still at stake about possession? 
12 MR. BRONSON: Well, our argument, and the reason we 
13 would appeal, is because D & K firmly believes that IHC waived 
14 its remedy — 
15 THE COURT: Sure. 
16 MR. BRONSON: - of forfeiture. And so -
17 THE COURT: - So why don't we give you the 
18 certification and you go up and appeal it? Do you think they 
19 won't accept it at the Supreme Court? 
20 MR. BRONSON: No. The point is - the point is, we go 
21 back to our original argument. Waiver, as you have 
22 acknowledged and the Supreme Court acknowledged, waiver is an 
23 intensely factual issue. 
24 J THE COURT: Oh, absolutely. 
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the possession — 
your right that 
THE COURT: - yes. 
MR. BRONSON: Our argument, of course, is that we're 
entitled to a trial on that issue because it is a factual 
issue. So your question is, isn't that ripe for abuse. Well, 
in some situations, perhaps. 
THE COURT: Well, whether a Rule 54(b) certification 
of whether we have trial, will we resolve the remaining the 
damage issue, then the court then issues a possession order, 
what happens to possession pending appeal, whether it's off of 
54(b) or at the close of all the issues in the case? You're 
still in the same position. 
MR. BRONSON: We are, and I think we get the 
opportunity to argue a stay upon appeal and to go through the 
proper elements of the stay upon appeal -
THE COURT: And that stay, would that be argued to 
this court or to the appellate court? 
MR. BRONSON: We'll argue with both - to both -
THE COURT: Probably so. But wouldn't -
You're warned. He's going to argue it every where, 
but you knew that. 
Okay. But say I do the 54(b), you just get to move 
1 trial on- I mean — 
2 THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. What are going to 
3 trial on? It gets to this back to whether you're entitled to 
4 possession, period, doesn't it? And I guess I'm not sure how 
5 that issue's still alive, and that — I mean that's a very 
6 sincere question, 
7 MR. BRONSON: Okay- There are mechanisms for IHC to 
8 get immediate possession and to have those rights at their 
9 disposal- The mechanism to get immediate possession is not 
10 common-law ejectment- The mechanism which the legislature has 
11 laid out is the unlawful detainer enforceable -
12 THE COURT: Could they amend and do that? 
13 MR. BRONSON: Pardon? 
14 THE COURT: Could they amend at this stage of the 
15 proceeding and do that? 
16 MR. DURHAM: I would stipulate, Judge. 
17 MR. BRONSON: They can certainly amend. In fact, I 
18 think we would openly stipulate them to amending that, because 
19 those statutes which permit the right to a very accelerated 
20 ejection are based upon a public policy that a tenant in 
21 default, under a technical term, a monetary term, has the right 
22 to cure it. 
23 I There are a number of cases. They go from the waiver 
24 I cases to the substantial-compliance cases, where courts have 
25 | struck down the forfeiture because the party is in substantial 
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1 compliance, but may have missed on a technicality. That's the 
2 policy underlying unlawful detainer statutes, to give a tenant 
3 who missed a late payment the opportunity to cure and not 
4 immediately eject them. That's the policy here. And — 
5 THE COURT: Is that -
6 MR. BRONSOW: - because -
7 THE COURT: - a right available after the court's 
8 found a forfeiture or a waiver? 
9 MR. BRONSON: They didn't proceed under that. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I'm saying if they now amended to 
11 use the unlawful detainer, would the right to cure still be 
12 available? 
13 MR. BRONSON: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. It's a three-day 
14 right to cure for the notice to pay or quit, and then, once the 
15 action is filed, there's a notice from the court for a right to 
16 cure, if I understand the statutes correctly. 
17 But my point is, the law abhors a forfeiture, and 
18 here we never got the option to cure. D & K never got the 
19 option to cure. That's the policy behind the immediate 
20 possession argument. That's not what they have. They 
21 deliberately elected to proceed in a common-law ejectment. 
22 That means they're saddled with the rules with regard to 
23 I common-law ejectment, and that means they don't get possession 
24 | until there's a final order, nor do we get to appeal until 
25 I there's a final order. 
16 
1 THE COURT: And what other good is served? What other 
2 judicial economy? What other right of the parties is served if 
3 really this issue, as you say for the Supreme Court to decide. 
4 If this Court decides it wrongly it needs to go back to the 
5 finder of fact, 
6 MR. BRONSON: This Court has the authority to revisit 
7 its decision at any point. 
8 THE COURT: Well, sure, but I'm not going to 
9 reconsider that because I think it's right. 
10 MR. BRONSON: As your Honor mentioned -
11 THE COURT: - tougher issue is where we go from here 
12 procedurally. 
13 MR. BRONSON: I didn't cite the cases but your Honor 
14 cited the cases, Delgado and Buse and those cases with regard -
15 those are yet to be decided in this case potentially and those 
16 issues may very well be on appeal. It is appropriate that this 
17 Court not certify this issue as a final (inaudible) now. 
18 THE COURT: I don't think the Court can determine 
19 forfeiture - wavier equaling forfeiture without implicitly 
20 dealing with the Delgado-Buse line and the non-substantial -
21 whatever the term is. 
22 MR. BRONSON: Substantial compliance. 
23 THE COURT: Substantial compliance, yeah. 
24 j MR. BRONSON: That maybe the case. That, I think, is 
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they may well be good ones and I'll be directed by what the 
appellate court says, shouldn't it be getting up there as soon 
as possible and whenever that happens you're going to have to 
deal with the stay issue, 
MR- BRONSON: I think Kennecott says no, it shouldn't 
get up there as soon as possible. What they should do is you 
resolve all these issues and let the court learn the facts one 
time and decide all -
THE COURT: I think that's the core point, whether 
Kennecott applies, whether we have here common factual issues, 
I mean I know what Kennecott says and I agree that if we have 
common factual issues we shouldn't be certifying anything. I 
think where we disagree is I probably disagree on the waiver. 
I don't think we have any common factual issues left and I 
don't think there's any factual dispute left on the issue of 
totality on waiver but that's for another day. That ruling's 
behind me and that's going to be decided separately. 
But on Kennecott, it's sort of the same dispute we 
have, we just disagree, don't we? 
MR. BRONSON: From what I'm - without you having yet 
ruled, I think we - I think I can -
THE COURT: Just on the understanding of how 
1 Kennecott would apply with that. 
2 MR. BRONSON: I think the Court may be disagreeing 
3 in principle somewhat with Kennecott but I believe Kennecott 
4 and its progeny is very clear. 
5 THE COURT: No, I wouldn't admit to disagreeing in 
6 principle. I don't. I think it's a good rule. 
7 (Both talking) 
8 THE COURT: - once a common factual issue always a 
9 common factual issue. I guess what I'm missing, Mr. Bronson, 
10 is how we really have common factual issues anymore and if you 
11 can point those to me -
12 MR. BRONSON: It's not the factual issues underlying 
13 the remedies that count. It's the common facts that underlie 
14 the claims and we have three claims arising out of what they 
15 continue to call wrongful possession and a breach of contract. 
16 Everyone of the remedies that are available, potentially, arise 
17 out of that same nexus of facts. That can't be disputed. And 
18 all the cases, Kennecott and all the cases that interrupt that 
19 say we want a narrow appeal rule and the underlying - the 
20 nexus, the overlap of facts when the remedies are different 
21 that arise out of the same underlying facts, there is no 
22 J certification on appeal. So - and that issue was dealt with in 
23 | Kennecott. And to the extent that there are circuits and 
24 | districts that go the other way and except another rule, they 
25 | were dealt with in Kennecott. 
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1 Their cited case is Olympia. Olympia was disposed of 
2 in Kennecott. That's not the rule in Utah, The rule in Utah 
3 is a very narrow approach. And the (inaudible) court, of 
4 course, has its justifications, but the primary justificatioa 
5 is to condense or appeal all issues and almost inevitably there 
6 certainly will be other issues on appeal from this case. 
7 THE COURT: I'm sure that's true. Although not quite 
8 true. I mean there could be a damages trial where there isn't 
9 that much at issue, but that's for another day. 
10 Anything else, Mr. Bronson? 
11 MR. BRONSON: I think that's it, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, and thank you both for a real 
13 aggressive argument. 
14 I think the bottom line is that the Court has 
15 determined, yet to be decided whether the Court is right or 
16 wrong but the Court has determined that there is forfeiture. 
17 That forfeiture leads to a right to retake the possession. The 
18 only remaining issues this Court can identify are those that go 
19 to the issues of damages resulting from that possession 
20 following the forfeiture. The Court agrees that there were 
21 common facts initially but at this stage there are no facts yet 
22 to be resolved with respect to the issue of forfeiture and 
23 possession that are in common with the facts to be resolved 
24 regarding the breach of contract damages claim. 
25 The Court finds no reason not to, one, agree to issue 
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1 I in contracts• 
2 J The Supreme Court in 1983 said, you affirm a portion 
3 of a contract, you affirm the whole. Now, that's—goes all 
4 J the way back to 1936, also* So— 
5 J THE COURT: Now, did you argue that to the Supreme 
6 Court? 
7 MR, ZUNDEL: Yes, we did. 
8 I THE COURT: Then they didn't really say that, did 
9 J they, when they discussed waiver? Justice Wilkins, I mean, 
10 J that's—wouldn't that make sense, that if that was persuasive 
11 J to the Supreme Court, they would have come back and said, 
12 I under these facts, one way of raising waiver is you affirm the 
13 J part, you affirm the whole? 
14 J I mean, it's a great phrase, I like it. But why 
15 I didn't they pick it up? 
16 MR. ZUNDEL: I—I think they too—I think they took 
17 I the—the—they—they took the largest peg sticking out of the 
18 J Wall to hang the decision on, which was: You didn't even get 
19 I the facts right, Judge. 
20 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
21 J MR. ZUNDEL: So, I'm sending it back to you, it is 
22 J premature, at best, at best, it's premature. At worst, it's 
23 I wrong. 
24 J THE COURT: I guess we're reading it differently. 
25 | I hear your argument, Mr. Zundel, but I—I am not 
9 
1 j sure that truly, except for at the beginning, you addressed ifty 
2 J specific question, you've addressed whether a waiver's 
3 J occurred and you made it well, I appreciate it; but if this 
4 I Court was to determine under the undisputed facts that are now 
5 J in the recprd, that a waiver has not occurred, is there some 
6 J reason under the law of summary judgment, this Court could nbt 
7 do that? 
8 MR- ZUNDEL: Absolutely. Because there are fact£ in 
9 J the record which look—which addressed in the light most 
10 J favorable to this client of ours^-of mine, D & K, show a 
11 I distinct, unequivocal act of waiver, inconsistent with any 
12 J other result, any other intent. 
13 J You know, this idea of corporate intent, let'^— 
14 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
15 MR. ZUNDEL: I see that—I see that IHC grabs onto 
16 J this, but it doesn't want to acknowledge that, as a 
17 corporatipn, it's bound by the acts of its agent. You know, 
18 J it—it talks about in its memoranda on its motion, this 
19 J motion— 
20 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
21 I MR. ZUNDEL: —it says, you know, we accepted the 
22 J April rent, that should not be held against us because it was 
23 J delivered to our home office, and— 
24 THE COURT: Well,— 
25 MR. ZUNDEL: —and we— 
10 
1 J THE COURT: —what they're saying there, though, is 
2 J still consistent. They're saying, within the facts of this 
3 I case that are undisputed, when you have to find a knowing, an 
4 I intentional waiver, these facts cannot support that under the 
5 J totality of the circumstances, which include that that was not 
6 J the place the rent was directed to go, plus all the other 
7 I facts. 
8 I I don't think it's disavowing the acts of their 
9 J agents. They do take—IHC took it, IHC cashed it, IHC kept 
10 J it, but that is not, under these circumstances, evidence of 
11 J intent. 
12 J MR. ZUNDEL: How do you determine intent? Are you— 
13 J are you saying they couldn't have wanted to waive because they 
14 I wanted to do something else with this property that would be 
15 I better for th&m? And I can divine—I can divine that because 
16 J they—somebody wanted to do that and nobody would have wanted 
17 I to waive this contract that they didn't waive, or do you say 
18 I that they don't have a corporate resolution, so they didn't 
19 J waive? 
20 J What—what—what are we saying? I—and if I'm— 
21 I THE COURT: I mean, I think you plead waiver, you've 
22 I got to show the facts that support waiver. 
23 | MR. ZUNDEL: Well, let's—let's show this then/ 
24 | let's ask—let me ask you this, Judge. 
25 I THE COURT: Uh huh. 
11 
1 J MR- ZUNDEL: Take the hypothetical in a 15-minute 
2 I increment. 
3 J THE COURT: In a what? I'm sorry. 
4 J MR- ZUNDEL: Or—take a hypothetical, you've got a— 
5 I you've got a ten-minute increment, three statements in ten 
6 I minutes. 
7 I THE COURT: Oh. Okay. 
8 J MR. ZUNDEL: The first statement is, I default you, 
9 I I want—I terminate the contract. 
10 J Five minutes later, you say, okay- I don't 
11 I terminate the contract, I waive. 
12 I Five minutes after that, you say, I—I terminate, I 
13 J was only kidding before-
14 J So, now, do you say, under the totality of the 
15 circumstances, I got two against one? Or do you say, look, in 
16 J that instant, you waived and you're bound by it. 
17 J THE COURT: You show me those facts and you're going 
18 I to win. 
19 MR. ZUNDEL: Okay. Mr. Urioha's letter. Dear 
20 Tenant: The— 
21 THE COURT: That's not what—the intent. The intent 
22 I isn't even to D & K. This fits the Court of Appeals decision 
23 I sets—suggests enforcement of certain contract conditions 
24 | during a period of unlawful possession are not inconsistent 
25 I with a desire not to waive. It's not your hypothetical. 
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